What Castro Told Cuba About Those Missiles, Pps. 2-3

Calmer Light on Those (Outmoded and Subsonic) Ilyushin-28's in The Dismantling Wrangle, Page 2

I. F. Stone's Weekly

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How Our Free Press Uses Its Freedom in The Cuba Crisis

Devoted as I am to free enterprise in journalism, I still find it hard to bleed in unison with my colleagues over the new restrictions on press contacts with officials at the Defense and State Departments. Nor am I surprised by Mr. Sylvester's avowal of the government's use of the press as weaponry. This has been going on in Washington for years, and it has been facilitated by the readiness of the press corps to be the willing conduit of all kinds of official misinformation and mischief as dished out in the capital's 57 varieties of off-the-record-but-please-use-it press conferences. The so-called information officers of the government have long been engaged in brain-washing and most of the reporters here have been as eager inculcators of the U.S. cold war party line as their opposite numbers are to dish out the official view in *Pravda* or *Izvestia*. The handling of the Cuban affair from the beginning has hardly been a model of passionate eagerness to search out the impartial truth. The main and immediate reason for the uproar here is that an effort is being made by the Kennedy Administration to shut off those disgruntled elements, particularly in the Pentagon, who were trying to undercut the President's efforts at restraint by leaking to the press (as they do to the Hill when Congress is in session) the kind of alarums with which the Luce, Hearst and Howard publications have been whipping up opinion for stronger action against Cuba.*

ICBMs in Cuban Caves

A test of how freely our press chooses to operate in a war crisis is afforded by three recent examples. The latest, which had just begun to develop as this was written, might be called the Case of the Caves. In the New York *Herald-Tribune* of Nov. 6, Marguerite Higgins reported that we were insisting on on-site inspection in Cuba. "According to Mr. McCloy," she wrote, "this meant that international inspectors must be able to look behind trees and crawl through caves. . . ." This looked like a scenario for a Mack Sennett film, with Russians frantically pushing baby missiles in little hand carts around trees and through tunnels with U.S. inspectors in wild pursuit. But the same morning the *Baltimore Sun* carried a Washington dispatch quoting an unnamed "refugee Cuban geologist" as saying that "all of the Soviet missile bases in Cuba are located close to large underground caverns, ideal for storing such weapons." Within a few hours, surmise had become reality. That afternoon a page one story in the *Washington Star* already had the Soviet missiles "in seven caves" (no more, no less), in "sufficient number to destroy half the American continent," and placed there "since the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement to dismantle the open missile sites." This time a Cuban refugee leader was quoted by name, but turned out to be a lawyer, not a geologist, a Mr. Fernando Garcia Chacon.

It would make an instructive class in evidence to put Mr. Garcia in the witness chair. Garcia said he was "unable to name the precise location" of these seven caves except for two seen by another refugee, Mr. Luis Ferdinand Rocha, who returned from Cuba to Miami in September. Mr. Fernandez said he got within 200 yards of two caves and "waited for two days until the metal doors were opened but was unable to see what was inside." No Cubans, according to Mr. Garcia, have been allowed to approach these caves since the sites were completed. Nevertheless he knows that while our planes spotted only 30 missiles, "The Soviet Union can take out of Cuba and permit the inspection of more than 50 missiles, but there are on Cuba territory sufficient missiles to destroy half the continent." Mr. Garcia added another chilling detail when he said, "some of the underground installations are big enough for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles of a type not previously mentioned by the Defense Department as being in Cuba." What would Castro want intercontinental ballistic missiles for? To threaten Khrushchev?

(Continued on Page Four)

NATO Split on Inspection by Invitation

Few, if any, newspapers seemed to give their readers the vote by nations in the UN's First Committee Nov. 5 when it passed a resolution (81 for to none against with 25 abstentions) calling on the nuclear powers to end all nuclear weapons testing by Jan. 1. This hid a split in NATO.

The key vote was on that provision of the 37-nation resolution as passed which declared the 8-nation memorandum at Geneva represented "a sound, adequate and fair basis for the conduct of negotiations towards removing the outstanding differences on the question of effective control of underground tests." This called for on-site inspection by invitation. Canada, Denmark and Norway split from NATO to vote for this provision while the U.S. and other NATO allies abstained. All Latin America except El Salvador, all Africa but South Africa and all Asia except Turkey, Thailand and Nationalist China also voted "yes" as did the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia.

On the final resolution as a whole, however, the Soviet bloc joined the NATO bloc in abstaining. Again, however, Canada, Denmark and Norway voted "yes" as did Yugoslavia. Cuba was the only Latin American country which joined the two blocs in abstaining; South Africa, the only African country; Nationalist China, the only non-Communist or non-NATO Asian abstainer. Since both blocs ignored past resolutions in resuming and continuing nuclear tests, no one expected this new resolution to interfere with their plans, either, though obviously the bulk of mankind was against them.

*** See box at the bottom of page 3 for an amusing sample of one of these Jeffersons in action.**

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What Castro Told Cuba Nov. 1 on TV About His Parley With U Thant . . .

The best source of information on Cuba lies in Castro's own speeches but the U.S. press ignores them, perhaps because they would conflict with the popular picture here of Castro as a fool or maniac. Here is the gist of his speech Nov. 1 in which he read from a transcript of his talks with U Thant. We have made no cuts which alter its message or tone, but have italicized important disclosures.—IFS

U Thant stressed the fact that his mission originated with meetings at the UN of 45 neutral countries "principally those which had attended the Bandung and Belgrade conferences." He said they asked him, "since I also belong to a neutral country and participated in the two meetings," to take the initiative in the Cuban crisis. *U Thant did* not mention any other weapons other than the missiles. "The U.S. told me," he said, ". . . Its principal concern is the missile launching *pads.*"

U Thant said the U.S. made two proposals to verify the dismantling: one of UN "persons whose nationalities are acceptable to the Cuban government" for ground inspection, the other a plane for reconnaissance to be manned by "persons acceptable to the Cuban, Russian and American governments" for the two or three weeks required to dismantle the bases. U Thant said the U.S. offered, if these conditions were met, to make a public statement in the Security Council "that it would harbor no aggressive intention toward the Cuban government and would guarantee the territorial integrity of the nation" and that it would also lift the blockade.

Only With Cuba's Consent

U Thant declared, "As Your Excellency knows, I said in the Security Council that this blockade was highly unusual, not very common except in time of war." U Thant said that in past cases, such as Laos, Egypt, Lebanon and the Congo, the UN had gone in only with the consent of the governments of those countries, and that it would go into Cuba only with Cuba's permission.

Castro commented that in the Congo "the government that requested it [UN intervention] is buried now." He hastened, however, to express his high regard for and confidence in "the present UN Secretary General." "All of us hold his mission and his person in great esteem" but he did not think peace could be safeguarded by "sacrificing the rights of peoples." He objected to "paying daily the price of an ephemeral peace" and added that Cuba "is not Austria, nor the Czechoslovak Sudetenland nor the Congo."

U Thant said he thought the UN presence in Cuba for two or three weeks would "lessen or limit the danger of aggression." President Dorticos broke in to ask, "Where is the danger of war? In the arms of one kind or another that Cuba has, or in the aggressive U.S. designs against Cuba?" He said the arms in Cuba, "regardless of what they may be, will never begin an aggression. Therefore, we ask ourselves: why is inspection, and an acceptance of inspection, a condition for guaranteeing peace? To guarantee peace it would suffice for the U.S. to pledge, with all necessary guarantees through the UN, not to attack Cuba." Castro said, "I wonder, if the Soviet Union authorizes inspection of its ships on the high seas, why would it then be necessary to inspect them again in Cuban ports?" He said the inspection requirement was only made to humiliate Cuba.

Castro closed this first meeting with U Thant by an observation on the stress the acting UN Secretary General laid on the U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba. "On this point," Castro commented, "I wish to say first that the U.S. has no right to invade Cuba and that it is impossible to negotiate with a mere promise not to commit a crime." He went on to say that if the UN attaches such great value to a U.S. promise not to invade, "why not concede equal value to the public commitment made to the UN by the USSR to withdraw the strategic weapons it sent for the defense of the Republic of Cuba?" He said these would be "two equally public commitments. If one of them needs no additional guaranties—that is, the U.S. commitment not to invade Cuba—why does the Soviet Union's commitment to withdraw its strategic weapons need the additional guarantee of inspecting us."

Castro, in his TV talk, said the second meeting with U Thant was confidential. He said he regretted the death of the U.S. flier who had been shot down over Cuba. *He praised the UN but said he had been "intransigeant" in opposing inspection because this would validate "the pretensions of the U.S. to decide what kind of weapons we have or do not have the right to possess."* Castro said that in his second meeting with U Thant he repeated that tensions in the Caribbean could only be allayed if the U.S. also ended the economic blockade. He complained "We are constantly receiving reports of vessels which were coming to Cuba and whose goods were left in Mediterranean, European or Latin American ports," because of U.S. pressure.

Of Guantanamo, Castro said: "It is absurd that the withdrawal of friendly weapons be requested and that an enemy base be left in our country . . . a base where, in these days of crisis, troops were accumulating to attack our country. Are we going to be asked to withdraw friendly weapons, while enemy weapons remain within the heart of our country?" He said the base was granted the U.S. as the result of unilateral pressure but added, "If we call that agreement legitimate, even more legitimate are the agreements between the Soviet government and the most free government of Cuba, by virtue of which these strategic missiles were situated in our country and for our defense.

Sweden Defies U.S. Blockade

"Stockholm, Oct. 27 (AP)—The Swedish government looked cooly today upon the U.S. blockade of Cuba and voiced support for UN Acting Secretary General U Thant's efforts toward a peaceful settlement. After a meeting of its Foreign Policy Board, the government issued a communique citing the principles of freedom of the seas. 'Under this principle,' it said, 'naval vessels from one nation may not in peacetime interfere with ships of other nations in international waters'."

—Washington Evening Star, Oct. 27.

"There were many encounters, however. Planes tracked many ships, and destroyers came to ask them by blinker code who they were, what they carried and where they were bound. One Swedish freighter was intercepted and queried but it blandly ignored all of the signals and steamed on past the destroyers."

—From a now-it-can-be-told story on the blockade by Richard Fryklund in the Washington Star, Oct. 30.

Some Calmer Light From Experts on Those Ilyushin-28's We Call Offensive

". . . the Il-28 tactical bomber is a type normally supplied by the Soviet Union to its allies and satellites. It is an old aircraft, virtually superseded in the Soviet Air Forces, and it is the view of aviation experts in London that although it may be physically capable of carrying a nuclear weapon, its presence in Cuba is not enough on its own to constitute a serious nuclear threat."

—London Times' Defense Correspondent, Oct. 26.

"Washington, Nov. 2—Now that missile bases in Cuba are being dismantled, the U.S. will watch for the departure of more than 20 Soviet bombers from the island. . . . The bombers, designated Il-28's are believed capable of carrying nuclear weapons to a maximum range of 1,300 miles. The planes' top speed is estimated at 550 miles an hour.

"In an all-out war, involving the exchange of nuclear-tipped missiles at speeds of 15,000 miles an hour, the Il-28's would probably only be of nuisance value to an aggressor, unless the aircraft were sacrificed against vital targets, such as air-defense communications posts.

"And in an attack on the U.S. the Il-28's would have to avoid Air Force interceptors with twice the speed of the bombers, and also dodge the Nike Ajax and Hercules air defense missiles. Both Nike types can climb higher than the ceiling of the Il-28's which is about 50,000 feet.

"Perhaps the principal value of the Ilyushin bombers to both the Soviet Union and Cuba is their possible use as training planes. . . . With 300 or 400 hours of flight experience in an Il-28, a Cuban pilot might be ready for a more modern bomber of supersonic speed."

—Washington Bureau, Baltimore Sun, Nov. 3.

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. . . Tried to Allay "Discontent" With Moscow and Explain Missile Removal

And if the U.S.," he added, "has placed the world on the brink of war to demand the withdrawal of those missiles, then what right and justification has it to refuse to abandon the territory it occupies in our country?"

Castro complained, "A few days before the crisis, barely two days earlier, we inaugurated the institute for basic sciences. Some 1,000 young people were to enter it to begin studying medicine. Within three days the institute for basic sciences was converted into an anti-aircraft artillery school, and thus went everything else." He said within three days they had to be "taught to kill, to be taught to handle not surgical instruments but cannon." He said these were "bitter tasks which have been imposed on us by the aggressors." He said Cuba wanted peace but peace with dignity and that the U.S., too, would profit by peace with Cuba.

Missiles Never Cuban Property

Castro said "in the course of this crisis . . . *there arose some differences between the Soviet government and the Cuban government*" but added, "It is not here that we should discuss these problems . . . where our enemies might find it useful or try to profit from those discussions." He said, "above all, we are Marxists-Leninists. (Prolonged pause.) Between the Soviet Union and Cuba there shall be no breaches!" He said he had confidence in the leadership of the Soviet Union and he asked his listeners also to "have confidence, be firm and have faith." He asked them *"in these moments when a certain disagreement may have been created"* to remember "how the friendly hand of the Soviet Union has been there with us after each Yankee blow—economic aggression, the suppression of the sugar quota, the suppression of the shipments of petroleum to our country." He asked them also to keep in mind "the technicians who have come to work with us in our rural areas, the teachers, professors, engineers, planters, technicians of all kinds, the interest, the devotion, the fondness with which they have helped us." He added, "Moreover there are the military technicians, men who have been ready to die here with us . . . teaching our men to fight and organizing the formidable army we have at this moment." *Castro said that several months ago the Soviet Union "decided to cancel all the debts of our country for armaments."*

Castro said there were military matters he could not discuss. "Nevertheless," he said, "I will explain something; for example, the strategic weapons for our defense. *These weapons, the strategic weapons, were not the property of Cuba.* That is not the case with the tanks and an entire series of weapons, which are our property. *The strategic weapons were not our property.* In the agreements," he went on, "by virtue of which they were sent to our country to strengthen our defenses against the threat of attack, it was decided that those strategic weapons, which are very complex and require specialized personnel, would continue under the direction of Soviet personnel and continue being the property of the Soviet State. *That is why, when the Soviet government decided to withdraw these weapons, which belonged to it, we respected that decision.*"

"I explain this," Castro continued, "so that the reasons why the withdrawal was decided on by the Soviet Government can be understood. That is why I was saying that, *even though we may have some well-founded reason for discontent* over some fact, some detail, more than ever we must remember how good, generous, noble and friendly the Soviets have been toward us." He added, "Let it not be thought that the withdrawal of the strategic weapons disarms us. This does not mean that we are disarmed. I can assure you that we have formidable means of defense.

Castro ended by saying that "during these days of extreme crisis it was not necessary to arrest anybody. Even men and women who criticized the revolution—in this decisive hour the patriotic revolutionary core became apparent and they went to enlist." Castro said, "we have long range moral missiles that cannot be dismantled" and that these were "our most powerful strategic weapon." He praised the spirit of the Cuban people and ended by saying, "today more than ever I feel proud of being a son of this people. Fatherland or death, we will win!"

Warlike Intellectuals Dept.

"As near as I have been able to determine after more than 10 baffling years [of reading The Reporter], Max Ascoli's method is to offer a straightforward thought and to surround, conceal and even occasionally contradict it with a flurry of tangents. The effect, stylistically, is of a Walter Lippmann column whose paragraphs have been scrambled; but Ascoli's message, when it gets through, is one of 'peace-through-force' resistance to Communism.

"In the current issue, Ascoli writes approvingly of the President's use of a show of force to drive Soviet missiles out of Cuba. Then he suggests that the missiles may not have been missiles at all, but cardboard dummies designed to be photographed by our reconnaissance planes and intended by the Kremlin to humiliate us without the risk of placing Castro's unruly finger on a nuclear trigger.

"Having advanced this odd idea, which denies the whole U.S. case for a showdown with Moscow, Ascoli then argues that it does not matter: 'Those missile sites, real or phony, must be destroyed'. And if they are, he continues, the Berlin wall will begin to tumble. Not because it, too, might be made of cardboard (Ascoli at least does not suggest that!) but because his point is that every Soviet initiative should be met with firmness."

—Al Horne's The Magazine Rack, New York Post, November 4.

Standing Four Square With Jefferson Against Censorship (Half The Time Anyway)

"Washington—A change is coming over the relationship between the American people and their government, and it remains to be seen whether this is permanent or temporary. Since the beginning of the republic, despite many attempted incursions against the free flow of information, the American people have clung to two basic tenets:

"1. The First Amendment to the Constitution, which says in part, 'Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. . . .' 2. The philosophy of Thomas Jefferson that, if the people are informed, they will do the right thing."

—Warren Rogers, Jr., in the New York Herald-Tribune Nov. 4 on the Kennedy Administration's news restrictions.

"The Kennedy Administration is bracing for a very hard propaganda onslaught from the Kremlin this fall, as a result of two new books: 'Fail Safe' by Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler, and 'Seven Days in May' by Fletcher Knebel and Chas. H. Bailey II . . . the themes they chose and the conclusions they reach are in the mainstream of the Soviet propaganda line. 'Fail Safe' is the story of an accidental nuclear attack by the U.S. on the Soviet Union. The Russians have hammered away at this . . . 'Seven Days in May' deals with a narrowly aborted military coup to set up a military dictatorship in the U.S. This, too, is a recurring Russian barb, usually expressed in terms of 'ruling circles in the Pentagon' . . .

"As the State Dept., the Pentagon and the U.S. Information Agency marshal their resources for the propaganda offensive, this thought occurs to me: Are such books in the national interest? . . .

"Censorship is vile. It is a tyranny to be opposed at all costs. But restraint and self-discipline are also part of the American ideal to be desired on some occasions at least over the current fad for 'mea culpa' masochism. We are agreed, I believe, that we do not want to grow as ruthless as the Communists in fighting them. But it is hard to escape the feeling that our one-sided adherence to Marquis of Queensbury rules will be the death of us yet."

—Same Warren Rogers in the Book Review section of the same Herald-Tribune two Sundays earlier, Oct. 21.

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Those Planned Scare Stories on "U.S. Deterrent in Peril"

(Continued from Page One)

We wonder how many newspapers will treat this story with skepticism. About as many, we suspect, as those which printed the facts on the dynamite attacks against the Creole Petroleum (Standard of New Jersey) oil installations on Lake Maracaibo in Venezuela Oct. 27. This was at once linked with Castro. It was widely reported in the U.S. press that a coded signal had been detected from Havana just before the raiders struck. The Venezuelan Minister of the Interior disclosed a week later that this supposed coded signal was (1) an uncoded cablegram from Havana to Communist students in Venezuela (2) that it had been intercepted only a few hours before the explosions while (3) the oil plant sabotage had been planned well in advance. A UPI dispatch on the ticker Nov. 5 carried this and also reported that it conflicted with "reports apparently originating in official sources in Washington, and attributed to the U.S. Embassy in Caracas" which had earlier claimed "Venezuelan officials had solid information linking Premier Fidel Castro's Cuban regime with the bombing operation." This if true, the UPI dispatch went on, "could have been a possible base for collective action against Cuba by the OAS." The only place I saw this printed was in the City Edition of the *New York Times* (Nov. 6).

Sample Trained Seal Briefing

A third example. On Oct. 26, when we were still on a collision course, an unnamed official (at the White House, I believe) called in a few favorite reporters and drew for them a highly exaggerated picture of the military significance of the missile bases in Cuba. That afternoon in the *Washington Star*, Earl H. Voss had a front page story, "Bases Peril U.S. Deterrent." John H. Finney on page one of the *New York Times* next day had a similar story, "U.S. Atomic Edge Believed in Peril." The ever frenetic Joseph Alsop in the *New York Herald-Tribune* the same day, on the basis of the same trained-seal briefing, reported "a vicious military trap" had been laid, "a darkly Macchiavellian scheme," to upset "the delicate balance of terror." *Time* (Nov. 2) said that if the plan had worked "Nikita Khrushchev would in one mighty stroke have changed the power balance of the cold war."

Consult? When There's Only Time To See Bright Colors Whizz By?

"Today's decisions at the highest level of military command require a range, precision and speed of communication and information processing beyond virtually anything conceivable in the past. Further, optimization of the electronic portion of a command control system cannot be considered independently of the capabilities of the ultimate, human decision maker in the chair of command.

"A good case in point is the SAC [Strategic Air Command] global command and control system 465-L for which ITT International Electric Corporation carries systems development, design and management responsibilities. In order to further multiply the effectiveness of the military commander, faced with the crucial task of assimilating vast quantities of information projected on the screens before him, ITT engineers and scientists recently added a remarkable new capability to 465-L: data presentation in color.

"Operating at speeds that appeared incredible only a short time ago, the system enables computer outputs to be converted to alpha-numeric form . . . photographed . . . developed and projected on control center screens in as many as 7 colors in a matter of seconds."

—From "How to Inform the Military Commander," one of those glamorous ads for technical help in the New York Times financial section Sunday, Nov. 4.

Though the same papers for months had been reporting our overwhelming edge in bombs and delivery power, they did not stop to ask how a few missiles in Cuba could change that overnight.

Now, with the crisis eased, we get a revised view. Relman Morin for the Associated Press has been writing a series on the Cuban crisis, "Days That Shook the World." In his final installment (*Washington Star*, Nov. 6), he reported, "The Cuban bases, in themselves, did not change the balance of nuclear striking power between the U.S. and Russia. But as a top official put it, 'they were setting up eight or ten sites for 30 or 40 missiles. If they were allowed to proceed, why not ten more sites? That could very much have made a difference'." *Nov. 6, 1962*

An Early Press Time Forced Us To Postpone Election Result Comment Until Next Week

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